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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION1

Chapter 1 Different Perspectives from which to Approach the Concept of Law3

1. The Difference between Formal and Material Perspectives3

2. Formal Perspective: The Three-dimensional Method in the Study of Law4

2.1. Structural Three-dimensionalism: The Values Plane, the Norms Plane, and the Facts Plane4

2.2. Three-dimensionalism of Principles5

2.3. Anthropological Three-dimensionalism: the Believer in the Church, the Citizen of the State, and the Individual in the Family6

2.4. Three-dimensionalism and the Theory of Knowledge9

2.5. Three-dimensionalism in Different Subject Areas of the Law11

3. Material Perspective14

3.1. From the Concept of Law to the Concept of Objective Law14

3.2. From the Concept of Objective Law to the Concept of Positive Law15

3.3. From the Concept of Positive Law to the Concept of the Legal Order16

3.4. From the Concept of the Legal Order to the Concept of the Legal Norm17

3.5. From the Concept of the Legal Norm to the Concept of Statute Law18

3.6. From the Concept of Statute Law to the Concept of Regulations18

Ⅱ. THEORY OF THE LEGAL NORM21

Chapter 2 Concept of the Legal Norm23

1. Defining the Legal Norm as Compared with Other Types of Norms23

1.1. The Legal Norm and the Moral Norm23

1.1.1. Differentiating Characteristics between Law and Morality23

A) By Subject25

B) By Object26

C) By Value Judgments27

D) By Coercive or Non-coercive Character27

a) General Idea27

b) Foundation and Goal of Punishment. Punishment and Deterrents28

E) By Heteronomous or Autonomous Character32

F) By the Type of Norm32

G) By the Sought-after Ends. Other Differentiating Criteria33

1.1.2. Relationships between Law and Morality34

1.2. The Legal Norm and Social Customs34

2. Structure of the Legal Norm37

2.1. The Ratio37

2.2. The Factual Situation and the Legal Consequence. The Legal Norm as Hypothetical Judgment. The Relevance of Causality and the Relevance of Imputation39

Chapter 3 Analytical-Linguistic Consideration of the Legal Norm, as a Prescriptive Proposition43

1. Initial Considerations Regarding this Process of Analysis43

2. The Concept of Proposition and how it Differs from Other Concepts45

3. Types of Propositions. The Traditional Approach and Enrico Pattaro's Approach46

3.1. The Representative or Semantic Function of Language47

3.2. The Descriptive Function of Language47

3.3. The Prescriptive or Preceptive Function of Language47

3.4. The Emotive Function of Language. Relationship with the Expressive Function47

Chapter 4 Classifications of the Legal Norms49

1. Primary and Secondary Norms. Historical Criteria for Differentiation49

1.1. The Temporal or Neutral Criteria: The Traditional Conception50

1.2. The Axiological-Functional Criteria: The Innovative Thesis of Rudolf von Ihering (1818-1892) in Tension with Karl Binding (1841-1920). The Kelsenian Position50

1.3. The Conciliatory Theory of H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law. Types of Secondary Rules51

1.4. The Axiological-Hierarchical Criteria: Differentiation in Constitutional Law52

2. Other Classification Criteria for Legal Norms52

2.1. By Material Effectiveness52

2.1.1. General and Individual Norms53

2.1.2. Abstract and Concrete Norms54

2.1.3. Regular Norm, Exceptional Norm-the Privilege-and Special Norm54

2.1.4. Necessary and Dispositive Norms56

2.1.5. Complete and Incomplete Norms (Explanatory: Legal Definitions; Restrictive; and Remittible: Legal Fictions)57

2.2. By Effectiveness in Time: Permanent Norms, Temporary Norms, and Transitory norms60

2.3. By Effectiveness in Space: Universal Norms, General or Common Norms, and Particular or Local Norms61

2.4. The Distinction Between the Norms of Public Law and Those of Private Law61

2.4.1. The Distinction from the Perspective of the Legal Relationship62

A) By the Subjects62

a) By the Nature of the Subjects62

b) By the Position of the Subjects62

B) By the Object63

C) Cicu's Thesis64

2.4.2. The Distinction from the Perspective of Legal Norms65

A) By the Character of Necessary Law or Dispositive Law65

B) By the Form of Protection65

C) By the Status of the Legal Norm65

2.4.3. Critical Conclusion66

Ⅲ. THEORY OF THE LEGAL ORDER67

A) Moments or Phases in the Life of the Legal Order: The Formation, the Interpretation, and the Application67

Chapter 5 Formation of the Legal Order: Theory of the Sources of Law69

1. The Sources of Law69

1.1. Formal and Material Sources of Law69

1.2. De Lege Data Sources and de Lege Ferenda Sources: Their Hierarchy72

1.2.1. Analysis of Article 1 of the Preliminary Title of the Spanish Civil Code72

1.2.2. The Issue in the 1978 Spanish Constitution73

2. Communitarian Law74

3. Written Law as the Principal Source in the Roman-Germanic System75

3.1. Codification and Constitutionalism78

3.2. The Legality Principle79

3.3. The Hierarchy of the Different Types of Law in a Broad Sense80

3.3.1. The Constitution as a Supreme Law80

3.3.2. International Treaties83

3.3.3. Organic Laws85

3.3.4. Ordinary Laws86

3.3.5. Executive Branch Norms: Executive Orders and Legislative Decrees; Regulations86

4. Custom as a Spontaneous Reiteration of the Acts of the People88

4.1. Concept and Requirements88

4.2. Types of Custom93

4.3. Proof of Custom94

5. General Principles of Law95

5.1. Naturalist and Positivist Conceptions: Express and Non-Express General Positive Principles95

5.2. Constitutional Principles98

5.3. Other Classifications of Principles Based on Their Objective, Level of Generality, and Function101

6. Case Law102

6.1. Diverse Understandings of the Term102

6.1.1. lurisprudentia as Science-in Roman Law102

6.1.2. Precedent-in the Common Law System102

6.1.3. Jurisprudence as Judicial Phenomenon-in the Roman-Germanic System104

6.2. The Requirements of Case Law104

6.3. The Legal Value of Case Law105

7. Contracts108

8. Jurisprudence108

Chapter 6 Interpretation of the Legal Order111

1. Interconnection between the Processes of Application and Interpretation of Law111

2. The concept of Interpretation. Elements112

2.1. The Anima or Purpose; the Corpus or Object112

2.2. The Means or Criteria of Interpretation: Article 3.1 of the Preliminary Title of the Spanish Civil Code116

2.2.1. The Literal or Grammatical Interpretation116

2.2.2. The Logical Interpretation117

A) Legal Formalism117

B) The Anti-formalist Revolt119

2.2.3. The Systematic Interpretation121

2.2.4. The Historical Interpretation122

2.2.5. The Sociological Interpretation123

3. Types of Interpretation124

3.1. By its Results: Declarative-Broad, Strict-, Extensive, Restrictive, and Corrective124

3.2. By its Author: Private, Public-Authentic, Official, and Common125

3.3. By its Object: Interpretation "of" the Constitution and Interpretation "from" the Constitution126

3.4. Product-interpretation and Activity-interpretation127

Chapter 7 Application of the Legal Order129

1. Analogy129

1.1. Concept129

1.2. Origin and Historical Evolution135

1.3. Foundation137

1.4. Function137

1.5. Requirements139

1.6. Field of Applicability141

1.6.1. Analogy in Criminal Law142

1.6.2. Analogy and Exceptional Norms143

1.7. The Difference between Analogy and other Similar Concepts:Analogy and Extensive Interpretation145

2. Equity146

2.1. Equity as "Vitalized Justice"146

2.2. Its Complex Meaning and Variable Content in Different Time Periods and Legal Systems. Historical Types of Equity in Western European Culture147

2.2.1. The Aristotelian Epieikeia149

2.2.2. The Roman Aequitas (the Aequum et Bonum)150

2.2.3. The Christian Benignitas and the Canonical Aequitas151

2.2.4. Equity According to the Conceptions of Medieval and Modern Writers from Continental Europe152

2.2.5. The Concept of Anglo-American Equity152

2.3. Equity in Continental Private Law and in Continental Public Law-Especially in Public International Law153

2.4. Equity and General Principles of Law155

3. Other Types of Legal Arguments155

3.1. Arguments Based on the Ratio: A Fortiori Argument and A Contrario Argument155

3.2. Other Legal Arguments160

3.2.1. The A Cohaerentia Argument160

3.2.2. The Sedes Materiae Argument160

3.2.3. The A Rubrica Argument161

3.2.4. The Non-redundant Argument161

3.2.5. The Ad Absurdum Argument161

3.2.6. The Pragmatic Argument162

3.2.7. The Argument of Authority162

3.2.8. The Psychological Argument162

B) Characteristics of the Legal Order: Completeness, Coherence, and Unity165

Chapter 8 The Completeness of the Legal Order. Gaps in the Law167

1. Principal Theories Utilized by the Legal Order's Dogma of Completeness167

1.1. The Theory of Empty Legal Space169

1.2. The Theory of the Exclusive General Norm169

1.3. The Theory of the Non Liquet Prohibition170

2. The Problem of Gaps in the Law170

2.1. The Concept and Types of Gaps in the Law170

2.2. The Principal Legal Means of Filling in Gaps in the Law173

2.2.1. Hetero-integration: Resort to Natural Law173

2.2.2. Self-integration173

2.2.3. Judicial Discretion174

Chapter 9 The Coherence of the Legal Order. Legal Antinomies175

1. The Concept of System175

2. The Problem of Antinomies175

2.1. Concept and Types of Antinomies. False Antinomies175

2.2. Criteria for the Resolution of Antinomies179

2.2.1. Criteria for the Resolution of First-level Antinomies or between Norms: Hierarchical, Chronological, by Specialty, and by Competency179

2.2.2. Criteria for the Resolution of Second-level Antinomies or between the Criteria Themselves180

Chapter 10 The Unity of the Legal Order. The Validity of the Law183

1. The Suitability of the Three-dimensional Approach with Regards to the Topic of Validity183

2. The Concept of Validity190

2.1. Material Validity of Legitimacy: The Justice of Law193

2.2. Formal Validity or Validity in the Strict Sense: The Existence of Law194

2.3. Sociological Validity or Efficacy: Obedience to the Law195

Chapter 11 The Deontological or Naturalist Foundation of Validity199

1. Relations Existing in the Matter of Validity199

1.1. The Relation between Law and Religion199

1.2. The Relation between the Legal and the Moral: Dynamic and Static Systems201

1.3. The Relation between Natural Law and Positive Law: Deductive and Inductive Systems203

1.4. The Relation between Divine, Natural, and Positive Law207

2. Some Natural Law Theories208

2.1. Saint Thomas Aquinas'Theory of Law208

2.2. The Naturalism of Francisco Suarez211

2.2.1. Law in General212

2.2.2. Divine and Natural Law213

2.2.3. Human and Civil Law213

2.3. Voluntarism or Legal Subjectivism. Main Theories214

2.3.1. The Internal Plane: The Theory of Social Contract214

2.3.2. The International Plane: The Principle "Pacta Sunt Servanda"215

2.4. Leon Petrazycki's Psychological Theory of Validity216

2.5. Gustav Radbruch and the Security-Justice Binomial217

2.6. Coexistence as a Justification of Law in Sergio Cotta217

2.7. Jurgen Habermas' Theory of "Diskursethik"219

2.8. Ronald Dworkin's Anti-positivist Theory of "Legal Policies" as a Reaction to Hart221

Chapter 12 Positivist Foundation of Validity223

1. Relations Existing on the Subject of Validity223

1.1. Validity in Normativism and in Positivism223

1.2. Validity of a Legal Norm and of the Legal System in its Entirety. Can the Legal System be Self-Validating?224

1.3. Validity in International Law and in Domestic Laws224

1.3.1. Legal Monism225

A) The Primacy of International Law Thesis226

B) The Primacy of Domestic Law Thesis226

1.3.2. Legal Dualism227

1.3.3. Legal Pluralism228

1.4. The Relation between the Plane of "Is" and the "Ought-To-Be"228

2. Main Positivist Theories230

2.1. Theories of the Basic Norm230

2.1.1. Hans Kelsen's Theory of the "Stufenbau" and the"Grundnorm"230

2.1.2. H. LA. Hart's Theory of the "Rule of Recognition." A Comparative Analysis of the "Grundnorm" and the "Rule of Recognition"234

A) Terminology235

B) Internal Statement235

C) Nature236

D) Content237

E) Function237

a) The Unity of Law238

b) The Coherence of Law239

c) The Completeness of Law240

F) The Relations to Facts240

G) The Relations to Values240

H) The Role in the Spanish Legal System240

I) Reconciliatory Theory242

2.2. Theories of Sovereignty243

2.2.1. Georg Henrik von Wright and Sovereign "Norms"243

2.2.2. Georg Jellinek and Sovereign "Power"244

2.2.3. The Sovereign "Subject"245

A) Jeremy Bentham's Theory245

B) John Austin's Theory246

2.3. Other Theories248

2.3.1. Joseph Raz's Theory of the "Chain of Validity," "Basic Power" and "Statements from a Point of View"248

2.3.2. Francois Ost's Theory of the "Boucles Etranges"249

Chapter 13 Realist Basis of Validity253

1. Relations Existing on the Subject of Validity253

1.1. The Relations Existing in the Matter of Validity between Statute Law, Common Law, and Case Law253

1.2. Civil Disobedience256

1.2.1. History261

1.2.2. Civil Disobedients: Thoreau, Gandhi, King, and Other Modern Civil Disobedience Campaigns264

1.2.3. The Concept of Civil Disobedience266

1.2.4. Civil Disobedience and Related Concepts273

A) Military, Ecclesiastic and Administrative Disobedience273

B) Dissidence274

C) Political Protest274

D) Exemplary Actions274

E) Criminal Disobedience274

F) Ethically Justified Criminality275

G) Resistance275

H) Terrorism276

I) Revolution276

J) Conscientious Objection277

K) Tyrannicide277

L) Instrumental Causes278

M) Militant Action278

N) Treason278

O) Non-Pacific Disobedience: Insurrection, Rebellion and Guerrilla279

1.2.5. The Limits of Civil Disobedience279

1.2.6. Justification to Civil Disobedience280

A) Moral Justification280

B) Legal Justification281

C) Political Justification283

1.3. Limits of Norms' Efficacy in Time-Non-retroactivity-and Space-the Plurality of Legal Systems and the Relations among Them284

2. Principal Realist Theories289

2.1. Scandinavian Realism. Alf Ross's "Normative Ideology of the Judges" Theory as a Reaction to Kelsen289

2.1.1. General Exposition289

2.1.2. Critical Review291

2.2. North American Realism293

2.3. Martin Diego Farrell's Theory of the "Axiom" and "Verified Law"295

2.4. Coercion Theory against Recognition Theory296

2.4.1. General Considerations296

2.4.2. The "Volkgeist" Conception of the Historical School of Law296

2.4.3. Santi Romano and Maurice Hauriou's Theory of the "Institution"297

Chapter 14 Problems Resolved by Considering Law From the Perspective of the Legal Order299

1. The Term "Legal Order"299

2. Problems Resolved by Considering Law from the Perspective of the Legal Order299

2.1. The Problem of the Norms' Recipients300

2.2. The Problem of Norms without Punishment300

2.3. The Problem of the Relationship between Validity and Effectiveness301

2.4. The Problem of Customary Law302

2.5. The Problem of Antinomies302

2.6. The Problem of the Insufficiency of Legalistic Positivism303

2.7. Other Problems303

Ⅳ. THEORY OF THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP305

Chapter 15 The Legal Relationship307

1. Historical Formulation of the Concept of the Legal Relationship308

F. C. von Savigny's Elaboration of the Concept in his Work System des Heutingen romischen Rechts308

2. Definition of The Legal Relationship: The Concepts of Legal Situation, Legal Act, and Legal Transaction310

3. Structure of the Legal Relationship: Elements311

3.1. The Subject311

3.2. The Object313

3.3. The Cause313

4. Content of the Legal Relationship313

4.1. The Legal Position of Power: Right, Potestas, and Ability314

4.2. The Legal Position of Duty: Burden, Submission, and Obligation315

5. Types of Legal Relationships317

5.1. By the Determinate or Indeterminate Nature of the Passive Subject317

5.2. By the Object317

5.3. By the Content, Purpose, and Organizing Principles317

5.4. Other Criteria318

Chapter 16 Right as a Part of the Legal Relationship321

1. The Law ("Norma Agendi") - Right ("Facultas Agendi") Comparison321

2. The Doctrinal Development of the Idea of Right324

2.1. The First Formulations in Rome and in William of Ockham (1290-1349)324

2.2. The Rationalist Naturalism Position. The Concept of Right in Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694). Right as Potestas326

2.3. The Issue in Positivist Legal Science during the 19th Century and the First Decade of the 20th Century327

2.3.1. Right as the Opposite of a Duty in the Analytical Jurisprudence of John Austin (1790-1859)327

2.3.2. Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) and Bernard Windscheid's (1817-1892) Theory of the Power of the Will ("Willensmacht")328

2.3.3. Right as a Legally Protected Interest in Rudolf von Ihering (1818-1892)329

2.3.4. The Synthetic Approach of Georg Jellinek (1851-1911)330

2.4. Denial of the Reality of Rights: Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832); Hans Kelsen (1881-1973); Leon Duguit (1859-1928); North American Realism and Scandinavian Realism330

3. Limits on the Exercise of Rights333

3.1. Abuse of Rights333

3.1.1. Theoretical Formulation of the Abuse of Rights Doctrine Starting from the Theory of Emulative Acts335

3.1.2. Positive Formulation: Article 7.2 of the Spanish Civil Code337

3.1.3. Case Law Formulation338

3.2. Temporary Limits on Rights339

Bibliography341

Index367